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  1 
THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: MISAPPROPRIATION OF 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE RHETORIC BY 
GLOBAL SPECULATIVE FINANCE 
TARA SANTOSUOSSO* 
RANDALL SCARLETT** 
Abstract: The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL) is considering changes to its rules governing international arbitration 
proceedings. UNCITRAL Working Group III is analyzing possible reforms of 
the arbitral rules to address the risks associated with the increased prevalence of 
third-party funded investment arbitration claims. Funders claim that existing 
regulation is sufficient, arguing in part that funding provides access to justice for 
impecunious claimants who otherwise would be unable to bring claims. This es-
say argues that funders’ access to justice reasoning is flawed at best and danger-
ously misleading at worst. UNCITRAL must take immediate action to address 
the potential for exploitative practices by funders in the investment context. 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay intends to contribute to the international arbitration reform 
discussions in Working Group III of the United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL). This essay analyzes whether the access 
to justice (“ATJ”) rationale set forth by proponents of third-party funding 
(“TPF”) in the context of investor to state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) is in 
line with traditional conceptions of ATJ as well as with UNCITRAL’s mission 
and the United Nations’ “recogni[tion] [of] the importance of fair, stable and 
predictable legal frameworks for generating inclusive, sustainable and equita-
ble development, economic growth and employment, generating investment 
and facilitating entrepreneurship.”1 This essay recognizes that there may be 
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 1 G.A. Res. 67/1, Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the 
Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, ¶ 8 (Nov. 30, 2012); see About UNCITRAL, 
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_
us.html [https://perma.cc/3CJ5-RHQS] (“UNCITRAL’s business is the modernization and harmo-
nization of rules on international business.”). The current topic of UNCITRAL Working Group III 
is “Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform.” Methods of Work, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION 
2 Boston College Law Review (forthcoming 2019) [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
other justifications for TPF in the ISDS context, but they are not taken up 
here. Instead, the scope here is limited to the ATJ rationale because it appears 
to be the most commonly cited justification for TPF in the investment con-
text. 
TPF in the context of ISDS has become a topic of intense criticism. This 
is largely because arguments for and against TPF occur against the backdrop 
of general disagreement over the efficacy and fairness of the ISDS system as 
a whole. It is important to remember that the ATJ rationale set forth by TPF 
proponents is inexorably tied to this debate and relies on assumptions under-
lying the legitimacy of the ISDS system as a whole. This essay attempts to 
separate out the issues that are unique to TPF in the investment context and 
implicate the ATJ rationale. 
I. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY ACCESS TO JUSTICE? 
The United Nations is committed to promoting ATJ and recognizes that 
“all . . . institutions and entities, public and private . . . are accountable to just, 
fair and equitable laws.”2 In the Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the 
General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Lev-
els (“Declaration”), the United Nations General Assembly “recognize[s] the 
importance of fair, stable and predictable legal frameworks for generating 
inclusive, sustainable and equitable development, economic growth and em-
ployment, generating investment and facilitating entrepreneurship.”3 In addi-
tion, the Declaration specifically “emphasize[s] the right of equal access to 
justice for all, including members of vulnerable groups, and the importance of 
awareness-raising concerning legal rights.”4 In the Declaration, the General 
Assembly “commit[s] to taking all necessary steps to provide fair, transpar-
ent, effective, non-discriminatory and accountable services that promote ac-
cess to justice for all, including legal aid.”5 
Civil rights movements in the United States are also committed to con-
ceptions of ATJ, which hinge on efforts by organizations, such as the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Legal Service Corporation (LSC), 
that focus on providing legal representation for poor and disadvantaged indi-
viduals, “combating predatory lend[ing], assisting in mortgage foreclosure 
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 2 G.A. Res. 67/1, supra note 1, ¶ 2. 
 3 Id. ¶ 8. 
 4 Id. ¶ 14. 
 5 Id. 
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proceedings [and] addressing landlord-tenant disputes.”6 The ATJ rhetoric 
harnessed by the legal aid community and civil rights movement in the Unit-
ed States has traditionally focused on the beneficial provision of legal ser-
vices to indigent and disadvantaged parties who have meritorious claims but 
lack the financial resources or knowledge to seek redress successfully.7 
Proponents of TPF in the ISDS context have hijacked this rhetoric to 
justify speculation on investment claims with far-reaching financial implica-
tions for disadvantaged and developing states. As Part II argues, TPF propo-
nents have manipulated the ATJ rationale to their purposes, distorting its tra-
ditional applications to fit questionable ends. Thus, in the context of third-
party funding of investment claims, providing ATJ cannot be equated with 
providing financing for parties who lack the resources to litigate. 
II. THIRD-PARTY FUNDING ACCESS TO JUSTICE RATIONALE 
Traditionally, TPF proponents have contended that they provide funding 
chiefly to impecunious investors who otherwise would not be able to bring 
claims against bad-actor states.8 Under this view, TPF proponents consider 
investment arbitration an indispensable means by which investors may seek 
redress when governments violate applicable treaty-based protections for 
their investments. Proponents have argued that TPF is a valuable tool that 
facilitates ATJ for investors who wish to seek redress but are financially una-
ble to bring claims, perhaps due to foreign governments expropriating their 
investments. As such, proponents frame TPF as a means by which claimants 
obtain ATJ, and thus, funders hail themselves as providing a valuable service 
that promotes global economic justice in a cost-prohibitive system.9 
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[https://perma.cc/9PSF-A64E]. 
 7 See id. (explaining that the LSC provides civil legal services to low-income individuals “to 
secure equal access to justice” and that the ACLU supports this cause). 
 8 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, REPORT OF THE ICCA-
QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 20 
(2018), https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/10/40280243154551/icca_reports_4_tpf_final_for_
print_5_april.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJY2-G4F4] [hereinafter ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE 
REPORT] (stating that “[h]istorically, third-party funding was considered as being primarily a 
mechanism by which financially distressed claimants could obtain access to justice”). 
 9 See Kelsie Massini, Risk Versus Reward: The Increasing Use of Third Funders in Interna-
tional Arbitration and the Awarding Security for Costs, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 323, 325 
(2015) (arguing that “[o]ne of the most important benefits of third party funding in international 
arbitration is that it allows for increased access to justice”). 
4 Boston College Law Review (forthcoming 2019) [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
Third-party-funded investment claims have dramatically increased in re-
cent years, possibly “fuel[]ed by the economic downturn in 2008.”10 While 
investors were seeking out unconventional investment opportunities, corpora-
tions experiencing liquidity problems were looking for alternative sources of 
funding because traditional sources (i.e., banks) were not lending and poten-
tial lenders were carefully scrutinizing corporations’ assets.11 Regardless of 
whether this proves to be a matter of causation or simply correlation12, there 
is no doubt that TPF’s prevalence has increased dramatically in the invest-
ment arbitration context. According to a 2012 report, “[t]he number of in-
vestment arbitration cases . . . surged . . . from 38 cases in 1996 (registered at 
[the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes], the World 
Bank’s body for administering such disputes) to 450 known investor-state 
cases in 2011.”13 As of April 6, 2017, there were 855 publicly known treaty-
based investor-state arbitration claims.14 The actual number of claims is likely 
higher, however, because some cases are confidential and therefore not in-
cluded in the public figures.15 The incentive to arbitrate privately is evident 
from examples of potential returns available, such as the 736% return on in-
vested capital realized by Burford Capital following the sale of its interest in 
Teinver S.A. v. The Argentine Republic.16 
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 13 PIA EBERHARDT ET AL., PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS 
AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM 7 (2012), https://www.
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 14 Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT: INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS?status=0 
[https://perma.cc/37CB-CGED]. 
 15 See id. (follow “About” hyperlink) (“The Navigator includes information about publicly 
known [international investment agreement]-based international investor-State arbitration pro-
ceedings. As some proceedings (or certain aspects of proceedings) remain confidential, the infor-
mation contained in the Navigator cannot be deemed exhaustive.”). 
 16 See BURFORD CAPITAL, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2017), http://www.burfordcapital.com/
wp-content/uploads/2018/03/BUR-28711-Annual-Report-2017-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND7T-
V9ER] (“We have just announced the sale of our Teinver investment into the secondary market 
which we continue to develop for $107 million, a $94.2 million gain and a 736% return on invest-
ed capital.”). See generally Maria Florencia Sarmiento, Argentina Ordered to Pay Over USD320 
Million for Unlawful Expropriation in Airlines Case, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.: INV. 
TREATY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/09/26/argentina-ordered-pay-over-
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In addition to the increase in claims, it appears that the focus of the liti-
gation finance market has shifted recently as well. Today, funders do not offer 
services primarily to those in precarious financial situations. Essentially, 
funding instead offers claimants the ability to reduce the risk associated with 
bringing a claim.17 The risk associated with bringing a claim in a pay-your-
own-way system is precisely what deters claimants from bringing claims 
lacking sufficient merit in the first place. In fact: 
[M]uch of the focus of the litigation finance market today is on the 
growing corporate utilization of funding by large, well-resourced 
entities. These entities may be looking for ways to manage risk, to 
reduce legal budgets, take the cost of pursuing arbitration off-
balance sheet, or to pursue other business priorities instead of allo-
cating resources to financing an arbitration matter.18 
In the words of a prominent funder, “[I]t is increasingly the case that more 
complex arrangements are becoming the norm, with companies using exter-
nal capital out of choice, not necessity . . . .”19 Far from providing ATJ for 
impecunious claimants, the creative alternate financing arrangements offer 
companies the ability to free up cash to pursue other business opportunities.20 
Thus, in the context of third-party funding of investment claims, this 
kind of financing cannot be equated with the traditional ATJ goal of providing 
financing for parties who lack the resources to litigate. Even so, some TPF 
proponents still argue that funding provides ATJ. In a rhetorical maneuver 
that distorts traditional conceptions of the ATJ rationale, TPF proponents 
claim that true ATJ in the Western economy is a business “being able to com-
pete while simultaneously litigating for justice.”21 
                                                                                                                      
usd320-million-for-unlawful-expropriation-airlines-case-maria-florencia-sarmiento/ [https://perma.
cc/YU4H-EW2U] (describing the Teinver case). In Teinver, the arbitration tribunal awarded over 
$325 million, but the appeal of this award is currently pending. BURFORD CAPITAL, supra, at 23 & 
n.7. Burford Capital “invested approximately $13 million in the matter” and sold its interest on the 
secondary market “for $107 million, a $94.2 million gain.” Id. at 23. 
 17 See ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 20 (“Put simply, funding 
is not only for those that are impecunious. ‘The use of funding offers the client the ability to min-
imize risk, does not have any negative effect on their cash flow, and ensures payment of law-
yers.’”). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Christopher P. Bogart, Third-Party Financing of International Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. 
REV. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/the-european-arbitration-review-
2017/1069316/third-party-financing-of-international-arbitration [https://perma.cc/D2K4-839N]. 
Christopher P. Bogart is the CEO of Burford Capital. Id. 
 20 See id. (“Rurelec was pursuing an arbitration claim against Bolivia for the expropriation of 
one of its power plants. It did not need capital to pay its lawyers. Rather, it needed capital to con-
tinue to grow its business . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 21 Ylli Dautaj & Bruno Gustafsson, Access to Justice: Rebalancing the Third-Party Funding 
Equilibrium in Investment Treaty Arbitration, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Nov. 18 2017), http://
6 Boston College Law Review (forthcoming 2019) [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
When funders choose which claims to fund, they employ an analysis 
that is unique to TPF. For TPF to provide ATJ, funders must fund meritorious 
claims. As such, TPF proponents claim that the decision to fund or not is 
based primarily on the merits of the case, the cost-benefit analysis, and the 
recoverability of damages.22 According to TPF proponents, funders have no 
incentive to fund claims that are frivolous or marginal because the promise of 
return is uncertain.23 
This incentive-based argument fails to recognize two important realities. 
First, the cost-benefit analysis performed by sophisticated funders necessarily 
involves analysis of the factors that contribute to the likelihood of success 
and, in turn, the likelihood of return on investment. This is concerning be-
cause empirical evidence points to a correlation between lower per capita in-
come and weaker rule of law in the respondent state and increased likelihood 
of the investor-claimant’s success.24 The funder would necessarily factor this 
correlation into its risk analysis when selecting claims to fund, resulting in 
non-merit-based factors driving claim selection and more claims being di-
rected at the least-developed countries (“LDCs”). Additionally, funders such 
as Burford Capital claim: 
Part of the secret of litigation investing is having a large, diversi-
fied portfolio so that [they] always have some cases going to trial, 
with the potential of high returns but the presence of binary risk of 
complete loss, while benefiting from the tendency of matters to set-
tle and produce desirable returns from the majority of the portfolio 
without litigation risk.25 
                                                                                                                      
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/11/18/access-justice-rebalancing-third-party-funding-
equilibrium-investment-treaty-arbitration-2/ [https://perma.cc/7P5E-FH7Q]. 
 22 See ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25 (explaining that, when 
funders decide whether to fund a claim, they consider “the case merits, the economics of the pro-
posed investment . . . and the enforceability of any award”); see also BURFORD CAPITAL, supra 
note 16, at 5 (stating that, when deciding whether to “invest capital or provide other services to 
corporate clients and law firms,” Burford Capital “consider[s] the asset value of claims, or the 
potential impact of other legal or regulatory circumstances”). 
 23 See ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 208 (discussing concerns 
about frivolous claims, and stating that “[a]nother response is that funders’ process for assessing 
claims and the typical terms and provisions in funding agreements reduces or eliminates the risks 
identified”). 
 24 See Julian Donaubauer & Peter Nunnenkamp, International Arbitration of Investment Dis-
putes: Are Poor and Badly Governed Respondent States More Likely to Lose?, 25 APPLIED ECON. 
LETTERS 321, 325 (2017) (explaining that a study of the effects of a respondent state’s per-capita 
income and the strength of domestic rule of law on ISDS found that “higher income and stronger 
than ‘normal’ rule of law reduce the probability of investor wins in international arbitration dis-
putes”). 
 25 BURFORD CAPITAL, supra note 16, at 4. 
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By implication of permitting investment into a portfolio of claims, some very 
high-risk (i.e., low probability of success and/or less meritorious) claims like-
ly will be brought to diversify the portfolio.26 A funder needs only a few high-
risk claims to succeed to reap large rewards, like including a few junk bonds 
in an otherwise lower-risk bond portfolio. This practice easily could translate 
to an increase in the number of frivolous claims brought. This situation recalls 
the original justification for prohibiting third-party funding—concern that the 
involvement of investors with profit-driven interests adulterates the judicial 
system.27 
This kind of analysis is the hallmark of speculation. This analysis not 
only conflicts with the United Nations’ goal of promoting equal access to jus-
tice—including to members of vulnerable groups, such as LDCs—sustainable 
development, and economic growth, but it also creates a paradoxical result. 
Less-developed and developing countries are disproportionately affected and, 
in turn, subjected to the risk of ruinously high investment arbitration awards 
and consequent economic hardship. 
This situational irony on its own is enough to raise serious concerns 
about allowing TPF in ISDS at all. Making matters worse, there is a complete 
lack of regulation.28 As “the investment arbitration system is becoming in-
creasingly integrated with the speculative financial world,” it is expected that 
funders will continue to “further fuel the boom in arbitrations [and] increase 
costs for cash-strapped governments,” among other concerns (e.g., conflicts 
of interest).29 “This financialization of investment arbitration has even ex-
                                                                                                                      
 26 See, e.g., Bogart, supra note 19, at n.9 (“According to its 2015 Annual Report, 87 per cent 
of Burford’s capital committed in 2015 financed portfolios and other complex vehicles . . . .”). 
 27 See Caroline Kenny, Third Party Funding of International Arbitrations, CIARB NEWS (Nov. 1, 
2017), http://www.ciarb.org/news/ciarb-news/news-detail/features/2017/11/01/third-party-funding-of-
international-arbitrations [https://perma.cc/HFZ7-EC9E] (discussing the reasons for the historical 
prohibition of third-party funding in common law jurisdictions). Historically, common law juris-
dictions prohibited thirty-party funding for the following reasons: 
[T]hird party funding . . . was said to offend the medieval torts and crimes of 
maintenance and champerty. Maintenance refers to an unconnected third party as-
sisting to maintain litigation by providing financial assistance. Champerty is where a 
third party pays some or all of the costs associated with litigation in return for a 
share of the proceeds. The prohibition against funding arrangements was historically 
intended to prevent the abuse of judicial process by wealthy English noblemen who 
would associate themselves with fraudulent or vexatious claims, thereby strengthen-
ing the credibility of the claims, and, in return, receiving a share of the profits. 
Kenny, supra. 
 28 See ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3, 5, 7, 8 n.21 (discussing 
current attempts at regulation and lack thereof at the international and national levels). 
 29 EBERHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 9. 
8 Boston College Law Review (forthcoming 2019) [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
tended to proposals to sell on packages of lawsuits to third parties, in the vein 
of the disastrous credit default swaps behind the global financial crisis.”30 
Although not the primary focus of the litigation finance market today, 
there very well may be examples where TPF provides access to recourse for 
impecunious claimants. As a matter of public policy, however, it seems mor-
ally objectionable to allow speculation in the context of ISDS, where out-
comes can result in devastating economic implications for developing na-
tions, even if there are limited circumstances where claimants actually are 
impecunious and thereby granted ATJ through a funder’s involvement. Simi-
lar to the ethical rules prohibiting an attorney from representing a high-profile 
criminal defendant in a murder trial in exchange for publicity rights if the de-
fendant is acquitted, speculation in the ISDS context also raises clear public 
policy concerns that trump the benefit of ATJ for the defendant. Not only are 
funders not subject to the ethical rules binding attorneys, but their presence 
shifts the focus from justice to financial returns, apart from claimant’s dam-
ages. On balance, it is evident that the risks posed by unregulated funder in-
volvement in ISDS substantially outweigh the potential benefits provided to 
individual impecunious claimants. 
To allow this system, where investors are incentivized to bet on weak 
economies, to go unregulated would directly conflict with the United Nations’ 
stated goals.31 Allowing the status quo of unregulated TPF in ISDS to contin-
ue would perversely promote unfair and unpredictable legal frameworks that 
exacerbate economic instability and exploit disadvantaged states. Given the 
well-founded concerns regarding the efficacy and fairness of the ISDS system 
as a whole, regulation of TPF at this stage is not a viable solution, and only a 
ban of TPF in ISDS is sufficient to ensure that exploitative speculation does 
not continue.32 At a minimum, policy-makers must seriously consider imple-
menting interim cost awards and mandating funder submission to the jurisdic-
tion of the tribunal to ensure enforceability of the cost award. As it stands, 
TPF proponents’ use of ATJ rhetoric is disingenuous at best and dangerously 
misleading at worst. 
CONCLUSION 
 UNCITRAL Working Group III needs to critically evaluate justifications 
for the proliferation of TPF in the context of investment arbitration. TPF pro-
                                                                                                                      
 30 Id. 
 31 See G.A. Res. 67/1, supra note 1, ¶¶ 7, 8, 9, 14, (describing the United Nations’ commit-
ment to “the advancement of the rule of law at the national and international levels” and to “the 
right of equal access to justice for all”). 
 32 See generally Frank J. Garcia, Third-Party Funding as Exploitation of the Investment Trea-
ty System, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming November 2018) (arguing that TPF should be banned 
from ISDS). 
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ponents’ claims that funding provides ATJ for impecunious claimants are mis-
leading because the world of litigation finance is more focused on large, well-
resourced claimants and creative accounting that allows corporations to keep 
the costs of litigation off-balance sheet. 
 The issues TPF raises in this context are inexorably tied to the overarch-
ing debate over the efficacy and effectiveness of the investment arbitration 
system as a whole. At a minimum, however, UNCITRAL must take immedi-
ate steps to prevent exploitative speculation by funders given the implications 
for developing and less-developed states. 
